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ENVIRONMENTAL DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
THE SEARCH FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY:
A LEGAL POSITIVISM APPROACH
Michael Ray Harris*
The failure of regulatory systems over the past two decades to lessen the environ-
ment degradation associated with modern human economic output has begun to
undermine the legitimacy of environmental lawmaking in the United States and
around the world. Recent scholarship suggests that reversal of this trend will re-
quire a breach of the environmental administrative apparatus by democratization
of a particular kind, namely the inclusion of greater public discourse within the
context of regulatory decision-making. This Article examines this claim through
the lens of modern legal positivism. Legal positivism provides the tools necessary to
test for and identify the specfic structural deficiencies of the administrative state
as an environmental lawmaking institution. More importantly, legal positivism
can be used to determine which changes to agency practice and procedure-of the
many scholarly proposals to do so-would most likely be accepted by the U.S. legal
system as a means to correct these deficiencies. To do so, however, American legal
positivists must overcome their obsession with the U.S. Constitution as the measure
of legal legitimacy in the American system. Instead, legitimacy of the environmen-
tal administrative state ultimately relies on fashioning rulemaking procedures that
address American's innate distrust of official power The view of a reformed regu-
latory state presented in this Article is one where regulators continue to function as
the technical and scientific experts, and in making policy determinations weigh
the expert knowledge with the informed opinion of electorate and peer officials in
the political branches of our government.
INTRODUCTION
No one can seriously deny that the scope and complexity of
environmental problems facing the world today are of the very
nature that the architects of the New Deal felt would require
"institutions having flexibility, expertise, managerial capacity,
political accountability, and powers of initiative" well beyond that
of any one branch of government to solve.' The task of addressing
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. I want to
thank Justin Marceau, Christopher Brown, and Sarah Coleman for their very insightful
comments; and to Sarah April and Katherine Johnston for their diligent research and edit-
ing.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,
2072 (1990); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1518 (1992) ("[T]he New Deal contemplated that Congress
should identify an area in need of regulatory control and turn the expert agency loose to
343
344 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 44:2
continued industrial-era environmental concerns-air, water, and
land pollution-require vast technical expertise, and emerging
post-industrial environmental issues-climate change, biodiversity
loss, deforestation, desertification, etc.-are complex, global
problems that call for monumental new regulatory efforts.
Therefore, if we intend to save our natural world from further
environmental harm, we must first rescue the troubled American
administrative state.
The problem, of course, is that despite three-quarters of a cen-
tury since the birth of modern administrative law, the political
legitimacy of our nation's grandest structural reform of govern-
ment since ratification of the U.S. Constitution is still unsettled in
many Americans' minds. There is both a longstanding mistrust of
agencies as technical regulators in this nation6 and, more im-
regulate."); Alexander C. Dill, Comment, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha: A Case
for the Delegation Doctrine?, 33 EMORY L.J. 953, 953 (1984) ("Congress [routinely grants] broad
discretionary authority to agencies in order to accord them the flexibility necessary in highly
technical areas of regulation such as nuclear energy and environmental health, as well as in
areas of economic regulation . . . .").
2. See generally Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Where Did All the Blue
Skies Go? Sustainability and Equity: The New Paradigm, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 399, 401-03
(1994). As one commentator recognized, "U]ust listing some of the many pressing environ-
mental issues [needing regulation] can lead to despondency: species extinction,
deforestation, desertification, toxic waste, acid rain, global climate change, and severe air
and water pollution in large cities and poor countries." Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental
Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1230 (1995). This has led some, including Justice Stephen
Breyer, to call for "the creation of a superagency larger and more powerful than the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to bring order to the irrational potpourri" of existing
environmental statutory mandates imposed on the agency. Id. at 1231 (citing STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 59-72
(1993)).
3. SeeJack Van Doren, Environmental Law and the Regulatory State Postmodernism Rears
Its "Ugly"Head?, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 441, 443 (2005).
4. While independent regulatory agencies existed well before the New Deal, the activ-
ities of these agencies were largely discrete and limited in nature, primarily aimed at
particularized fields of economic activity. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1252 (1986). The New Deal reforms accomplished by the
Roosevelt administration in the 1930s opened the door for the burgeoning, modern day
administrative state. Id. at 1262-63; see also Dill, supra note 1, at 953 ("Since their widespread
introduction during the New Deal, federal administrative agencies have played an increas-
ingly important role in developing and implementing congressional policies in various areas
of national concern.").
5. See, e.g., David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision
Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENvTL. L. 651, 653 (2006);
Louis J. Virelli III, Scientific Peer Review and Administrative Legitimacy, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 723,
724 (2009). Indeed, it has been said that the question "Why is there an administrative state?"
is not merely an academic question, but has been observed to "reflect[] the deepest of anxi-
eties of our political culture." PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 7
(2d ed. 2004).
6. See, e.g., David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to
Revitalize a Hloundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1 (2001) (describing the
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portantly, unending controversy over whether the political choices
inherently involved in agency rulemaking should be left at all to
institutions outside our constitutional tripartite national govern-
ment.7 As Professor James 0. Freedman observed, "[t]he enduring
sense of crisis historically associated with the administrative agen-
cies seems to suggest that something more serious than merely
routine criticism is at work."8 That something, perhaps, is "the
manifestation of a deeper uneasiness over the place and function
of the administrative process in American government."
This unease is not without merit. In the field of environmental
regulation, it is obvious that administrators increasingly fail, often
for political reasons, to make the painful public policy choices re-
quired by our nation's environmental laws."o The past few decades
have seen few significant new environmental regulatory efforts in
this country. Environmental controls in the United States-once
considered among the most stringent legal protections for public
health, welfare, wildlife, and natural resources in the world-are
now regarded as ineffective. Concerns about the poor quality of
our air and water are now regularly in the news," and with regards
to what may be the most significant crisis to ever face human-
kind-climate change-we have only just begun to contemplate a
national regulatory plan." In short, despite pressing needs, regula-
tors seem fearful to act, leaving us with a dismal regulatory record
on public health and environmental issues in recent decades.1 3
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that an emerging
body of scholarly literature, which I will group and broadly define
American environmental regulatory landscape as a battleground wrought with distrust and
conflict); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy ofDistrust in the Implementation ofFederal Environmen-
tal Law, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311 (discussing the "destructive cycle" of
agency distrust and failure).
7. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998); Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1512-13; Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1805 (1974).
8. JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 9 (1978).
9. Id.
10. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300,
300 (1995) ("Cleaning the air can foul the water; saving the salmon might threaten the
logger; preserving our climate could darken our rooms.").
11. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Neglected, at a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2009, at Al.
12. Andrew Revkin, New Climate Fight, Same as the Old One?, DOT EARTH (Oct. 14, 2010,
3:21 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/new-climate-fight-same-as-the-
old-one/.
13. For a general discussion on the failures of the environmental administrative appa-
ratus, see Peter Lehner, The Logjam: Are Our Environmental Laws Failing Us or Are We Failing
Them, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 194, 194-96 (2008).
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as Environmental Deliberative Democracy (EDD)," seeks to bring
to an end the top-down, authoritarian nature of the current regu-
latory system. EDD calls for regulatory reforms to make public
deliberation, and civic engagement, a required component of
environmental decision-making to make the environmental bu-
reaucracy accountable directly to the people." EDD is the
product of the environmental community's realization that our
existing form of government "has lost its democratic character just
as it has also sacrificed its ecological sustainability.""' Current legal
structures, such as the administrative state, are designed to make
citizens mere competitors in the lawmaking process, driving them
to abandon all commitments to greater social needs and focus in-
stead on their narrow self-defined interest in the regulatory
outcome." Administrative decision-making, in particular, lacks suf-
ficient democratic elements to ensure that rulemaking is both a
procedurally legitimate and substantively effective means to protect
environmental rights, both human and non-human alike.'
Beyond its proposals for regulatory change, EDD also has the
potential to transform sixty years of discourse among economists,
political scientists, and legal scholars regarding the generational
discontent with the administrative state. 9 Previously offered theo-
ries attempted to legitimize the administrative state largely as a
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Such proposals advance, for example, use of citizen consultations, forms, or juries
in all or part of the regulatory process; others go further and advocate for partial or total
citizen control of regulatory outcomes. See infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
16. WALTER F. BABER & ROBERT V. BARTLETr, DELIBERATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLI-
TICS: DEMOCRACY AND ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY 5 (2005).
17. See id.; see also Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice
Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 182 (1996) ("[Legislation] results from a
'legislative auction' where the special interest group with the highest 'bid' wins the legisla-
tor's services. The special interest group seeks legislation that benefits its group members,
who have a high stake in the legislative outcome. The legislator receives the bid, and in turn,
the special interest group receives the desired legislation." (footnotes omitted)).
18. See generallyJennifer Nou, Note, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 601, 629-30 (2008) (discussing "the democratic
deficit created by administrative delegation"). For EDD advocates, the system must not only
be democratic in nature, but representation must be extended "to entities which cannot
participate in the decision-making process, like future generations, animals, plants and the
nature as a whole, whose interests, though, can be represented by the present humans."
James Wong, Debating Environmental Democracy: A Social Choice Theory Perspective 5
(July 2008) (unpublished conference paper), http://www.keele.ac.uk/research/lpj/
ecprsumschool/Papers/James%20Wong.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform).
19. See FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 9; see also Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Gov-
erned: Against Simple Rules for a Complex Worid 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1997) ("Like
an intriguing but awkward family heirloom, the legitimacy problem is handed down from
generation to generation of administrative law scholars.").
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basis of political necessity,20 but have failed to provide real legiti-
macy to the administrative state as measured, for instance, by envi-
environmental regulatory outcomes.2 ' EDD, on the other hand,
accepts the failure of the administrative state in our system, and
assigns that failure to its inability to produce rules in a manner
consistent with the (democratic) properties our society deems es-
sential to constitute a norm that is seen as legally valid. EDD thus
attempts to cure, rather than sidestep, our uneasiness with bureau-
23
cracy.
It is, however, only upon examination of EDD proposals through
the lens of modern legal positivism that the potential for legitimiz-
ing the environmental administrative state is truly revealed. As an
initial matter, a legal positivist would reject existing theories that
20. For example, the pluralistic democracy theory seeks to justify the administrative
state largely on the basis that agencies are in an equal, if not better, position than constitu-
tional branches to evaluate and determine societal preferences with regards to distributing
governmental benefits. See generally Croley, supra note 7, at 3-6. As Professor Croley notes,
"theories" in this context is "used somewhat loosely ... as a less awkward term for what could
instead be called 'perspectives' or 'visions' of administrative regulation." Id. at 4. Like capi-
talist markets, pluralistic democracy embraces regulatory deal-making. In essence, the
government acts to "implement deals that divide political spoils according to the pre-
political preferences of interest groups." Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1514. Accordingly,
regulators should react only to those interest groups that find the status quo sufficiently
intolerable to incur the cost of complaining and seeking change. Id. at 1521. Several theo-
ries have been spawned from pluralistic democracy thought, including public choice theory,
neopluralist theory, and public interest theory. As Professor Croley has summarized these
theories:
The public choice account holds . .. that agencies deliver regulatory benefits to well
organized political interest groups, which profit at the expense of the general, unor-
ganized public. The neopluralist theory also takes organized interest groups to be
central to understanding regulation. On the neopluralist view, however, many inter-
est groups with opposing interests compete for favorable regulation, and that
competition is less lopsided than the public choice view contemplates. Because the
result of interest-group competition often crudely reflects general [public] interests,
... [w]hereas the neopluralist focuses on interest-group competition ... the public
interest theorist concentrates on the general public's ability to monitor regulatory
decisionmakers. Where ... the relevant decisionmakers operate without any over-
sight, they tend to deliver regulatory benefits [instead] to well organized interest
groups at the public's expense.
Croley, supra note 7, at 5.
21. Van Doren, supra note 3, at 479 ("[C]ourt decisions in environmental law seem to
mirror indeterminacy over time, as the regulatory state produces chaos, cycling, and unpre-
dictability.").
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. Mark Seidenfeld, The Quixotic Quest for a "Unified" Theory of the Administrative State,
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, no. 6, 2005 at 4, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art2 (not-
ing that a careful reading of Richard Stewart's seminal article, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1974), reveals a disbelief that any single theory
can explain and justify all the exercises of administrative power that characterize the United
States government today).
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justify the administrative state based on mere appeal to a normative
presupposition for its existence.2 ' Rather, legal positivism teaches
us that the validity of a legal system is solely dependent on its ob-
servation of, and obedience to, the rules constituting its
foundation. One of these foundational rules is H.L.A. Hart's "rule
,,26of recognition, which, vaguely put,7 states that every legal system
contains one underlying rule that sets out the criteria or properties
that other rules within that system must possess to be recognized as
a valid rule of that system. The rule of recognition works to rec-
oncile the precise type of normative, second-order uncertainty with
the administrative state that has been identified by EDD scholars:
the legitimacy of public officials (or institutions) to resolve first-
order, environmental public policy disputes.2
This Article takes legal positivism from theory to practice by ap-
plying it to the troubled administrative state in the context of EDD.
The Article demonstrates that a conflict exists between the admin-
istrative state and rule of recognition used to measure the validity
of lawmaking institutions in our system. However, because demo-
cratic institutions (including the environmental administrative
apparatus in this country) are structural mechanisms, it is there-
fore possible, as EDD advocates, to construct specific legal changes
to agency practice and procedure to correct the identified conflict.
With that in mind, however, it makes little sense to continue to
suggest that administrative reform proposals be implemented,
without first assessing whether the specific structural changes of-
fered would better ensure legitimacy based upon fidelity to the
rule of recognition.
Part I introduces the foundations of modern legal positivism
thought. Relying primarily on H.L.A Hart's theories, Part II seeks
24. See Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112010/entries/legal-positivism/ ("The ulti-
mate criterion of validity in a legal system is neither a legal norm nor a presupposed norm
... ."); Stephen V. Carey, Comment, What is the Rule of Recognition in the United States?, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1161, 1163 n.1 (2009) ("Positivism is a broad concept ... but it may be defined
generally as the theory that legal rules are valid only because they are enacted by an existing
political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are grounded
in morality or in natural law." (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
25. See Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Rule of Recognition (and Does it Exist)?, in THE RULE
OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONsTrrrIoN 235 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar
Himma eds., 2009) (arguing that every legal system must contain rules constituting its foun-
dation).
26. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961).
27. Hart's own treatment and description of the rule has been called "frustratingly un-
clear." Shapiro, supra note 25, at 235.
28. HART, supra note 26, at 100-03; David Dyzenhaus, The Demise of Legal Positivism?,
119 HARV. L. REv. F. 112, 112 (2006); Shapiro, supra note 25, at 238.
29. See Shapiro, supra note 25, at 242, 250-52.
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to test legitimacy of the environmental administrative state as a
lawmaking institution in our legal system. If officials in our system
consistently demonstrate that they do not perceive agencies as valid
legal actors, or bestow upon the norms derived from agency action
the official respect equal to that expected to be granted sources of
law in our society, then indeed the accepted conditions for legiti-
macy as a lawmaker are not met. Reflection on recent
environmental administrative law problems demonstrates that
agency authority is regularly treated with substantially less respect
and deference (in other words, comity) by the courts, the Execu-
tive Branch, and, to a lesser extent, by Congress than that due to a
valid legal actor of our system. Legal positivism, therefore, validates
the administrative state's illegitimacy with regards to environmen-
tal lawmaking.
Having demonstrated the illegitimacy of the current administra-
tive system, Part III takes up consideration of the appropriate rule
of recognition in our democratic system that, if followed, would
produce administrative legitimacy. It is often said that the Ameri-
can rule of recognition is the Constitution or some part of that
document.3o This assertion is rejected. Hart does not expressly re-
strict the rule of recognition (or rules, as some have argued") to
the product of express agreement.32 Instead, Hart saw his rules of
recognition being derived from the general characteristics that
they shared, whether from the fact they were enacted by specific
bodies or as a result of their long customary practice in society."
What matters most, however, is that laws, for Hart, are rules of be-
havior that require subjects and officials to behave according to
certain socially determined standards.
Accordingly, the rules of recognition in our system should be un-
derstood to include the democratic values that Americans accept
and regularly examine to determine both the validity of law and the
legitimacy of the lawmaking process." From this, it is theorized that
30. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 621 (1987); Kenneth Einar Himma, Understanding the Relationship Between the U.S. Consti-
tution and the Conventional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 95; Carey, supra note 24. If the Constitution is the final
arbitrator of legitimacy in our system, then the problem is quite apparent-absent a consti-
tutional amendment, true legitimacy of the administrative state will remain unattainable.
31. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
32. HART, supra note 26, at 92.
33. Id.; see also Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 626 ("What counts for law depends ulti-
mately upon prevailing social practices, that is, what officials take as counting as law.").
34. HART, supra note 26, at 107 ("[T]he rule of recognition exists only as a complex,
but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying
the law by reference to certain criteria."); Carey, supra note 24, at 1168.
35. See infra Part II.B.
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our oldest, and most cherished, democratic principle is the true
"ultimate" rule of recognition-trustworthiness. Indeed, all other
secondary rules of recognition in our system (including the Consti-
tution) are designed to ensure sufficient checks and balances,
primarily through well-defined engagement with other branches of
government and the citizenry, to limit inevitable official self-
interest and faction building."
Finally, Part IV suggests and defends specific changes to agency
procedure and practice to improve these agencies' trustworthiness
as lawmaking bodies and, therefore, increase the democratic legit-
imacy to the environmental administrative apparatus. Part IV
should not be read to suggest a singular, take it or leave it ap-
proach to EDD or administrative reform. Rather, the purpose is to
suggest that EDD scholarship requires greater appreciation of legal
positivism, and that reform proposals must be designed to appreci-
ate the system's rules of recognition. Moreover, through a
structural approach to reform the administrative state to better
meet our democratic values, we will begin to not only better pro-
tect environmental values, but also restore the trust that we have
lost for the American government due to its environmental regula-
tory inertia over the past two decades.
I. LEGAL POSITIVISM AND THE LEGITIMACY OF (ENVIRONMENTAL)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
A. The Foundations of Modern Legal Positivism
"The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is anoth-
er. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry."3
In this quote rests the sole distinction between legal positivists
like John Austin, Jeremy Bentham, and H.L.A. Hart, and the natu-
ral law views of those like St. Thomas Aquinas, Ronald Dworkin,
and Kenneth Einar Himma. Law to a legal positivist is what is ac-
cepted as authoritative within a given legal system ("the existence
of law"), and not necessarily what is just and right (its "merit or
demerit")." Policies that appear just, wise, efficient, or prudent-
without more-cannot lay claim to the status of law any more that
36. See infra Part Ifl.C.
37. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., 1995).
38. See Green, supm note 24, at 1.
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laws that are unjust, unwise, inefficient, or imprudent can be de-
nied that status." Law is purely a matter of social fact.4
For the legal positivist theorist, H.L.A. Hart, this distinction was
clear, but left unresolved the question of what constitutes society's
ultimate criteria for what counts as law. Hart rejected Austin's view
that the commands of a sovereign constitute valid law when based
solely on the sovereign's claim to power.4 In Hart's view, while
some or even many might obey the commands of a dictator in fear
of sanction, such a system of government "would not amount to a
legal system."4 2 Hart went to great length to distinguish, therefore,
the difference between being obliged to follow an order by force,
and feeling one has an obligation (within the system) to do so as a
citizen . In Hart's view, only the latter constitutes law."
From this premise flows Hart's theory of law as a union between
primary and secondary rules. Under primary rules, "human be-
ings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether
they wish to or not."4 Primary rules exist in the form of statutes,
ordinances, court orders, and regulations that apply to us everyday.
The obligation to comply with primary rules flows not from the
rules mere status as a "law," but from the primary rules' adoption
in accordance with the system's "secondary rules." Simply put, sec-
ondary rules "provide that human beings may by doing or saying
certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish
or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or
39. Id.
40. Carey, supra note 24, at 1165 ("Hart argued that law is a social fact and thus can be
distinguished from morality."); id. at 1168 ("Hart ... constructs a complex explanation of
the nature of law without appealing to moral or normative explanations. Laws, for Hart, are
rules of behavior that require subjects and officials to behave according to certain socially
determined standards"); see also Robin Bradley Kar, Harl's Response to Exclusive Legal Positiv-
isn, 95 GEo. L.J. 393, 397 (2007) ("Hart used the internal point of view to develop what has
come to be known as a 'social practice' account of rules and obligations, according to which
these phenomena are reducible to social conventions animated by a particular psycholo-
gy.").
41. Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 621.
42. Dyzenhaus, supra note 28, at 113-14.
43. HART, supra note 26, at 20-25, 79-84. As Hart described it, in a gunman situation
(A orders B, at gun point, to hand over his money), "we would say that B, if he obeyed, was
'obliged' to hand over his money.... There is a difference, [however], between the asser-
tion that someone was obliged to do something and the assertion that he had an obligation to
do it." Id. at 80.
44. Id. at 83 ("The statement that someone has or is under an obligation does indeed
imply the existence of a rule; yet it is not always the case that where rules exist the standard
of behaviour required by them is conceived of in terms of obligation. 'He ought to have'
and 'He had an obligation to' are not always interchangeable expressions. . .
45. Id. at 77.
46. Id. at 78-79.
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control their operations."" Secondary rules establish the legal
structure of a system, providing us the tools necessary to determine
who is in power and how such authority may adopt or change the
primary rules. Hart argues that the secondary rules are necessary
in any well-defined legal system because even "[t]he most uncon-
strained sovereign will still need to have his commands recognized
as such." 49 Thus for Hart, sovereignty itself is constituted by law.s0
Secondary rules provide a cure to what Hart saw as a deficit in a
simple social structure made up of only primary rules: uncertain-
ty.5' Hart identified such uncertainty when a dispute arises over
what the primary rules are or their precise scope. In a system made
up of only primary rules, there would be no secondary authority to
turn to for resolution." Hart believed this deficit to be ultimately
fatal to any legal system, and, therefore, introduced us to a remedy:
the rule of recognition. For reasons now to be discussed, the rule
of recognition has the most bearing on the theories that this Arti-
cle introduces.
B. H.L.A. Hart's Rule of Recognition
1. Background
The rule of recognition, to put it plainly, is the mechanism that
enables citizens and officials within a given legal system to ascertain
the primary rules of law. As one scholar has put it, the rule of
recognition explains "why the prohibition on insider trading in
section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is a rule of
law while the moral prohibition on being nasty to your elderly
mother is not."54
47. Id. at 79.
48. Id. Primary rules, therefore, impose duties while secondary rules confer powers. Id.
49. Dyzenhaus, supra note 28, at 114.
50. Id.
51. HART, supra note 26, at 91. Hart actually believed that a "primitive" system made
up of only primary rules would suffer from three deficiencies-uncertainty, static nature,
and inefficiency in enforcement. Id. at 90-91; see also Carey, supra note 24, at 1166 n.21.
52. HART, supra note 26, at 90-91; see also Carey, supra note 24, at 116 6 n.21.
53. HART, supra note 26, at 92 ("The simplest form of remedy for the uncertainty of the
regime of primary rules is the introduction of what we shall call a 'rule of recognition.' ").
54. Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852, 870 (2006) (footnote
omitted) (reviewing NicoLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE No-
BLE DREAM (2004)). To put it less plainly, but in Hart's own words, "[t]o say that a given
rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and
so as a rule of the system." HART, supra note 26, at 100.
352 [VOL. 44:2
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The rule is the embodiment of Hart's belief that there are two
minimum conditions necessary for the existence of a legal system.55
First, those rules of behavior that are recognized as valid with ref-
erence to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally
obeyed; second, the system's criteria of legal validity must be effec-
tively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by
its officials. Thus, in Hart's view, a developed legal system has
both a "behavioral element. . . and a cognitive element, where par-
ticipants develop a critical, reflective attitude toward the norm and
criticize deviations from that norm by others in the community.""
Unfortunately, while Hart provided substantial inquiry into the
nature of the rule, his own attempt to identify or conceptualize the
form of the rule in any system was, at best, confused." Many schol-
ars today assert that complex legal systems, like that of the United
States, most likely have a hierarchical rule of recognition that is not
a simple single rule, but consists of a bundle of rules each possibly
directed at different officials or jurisdictions."' Hart himself often
referred to "rules" of recognition6 o and to a system of "relative sub-
ordination and primacy."6 1 Yet, when read as a whole, Hart
consistently argues that in such a system, "one [of the rules] is su-
preme; an "ultimate" rule of recognition he suggests does exist."
In his words:
We may say that a criterion of legal validity or source of law is
supreme if rules identified by reference to it are still recog-
nized as rules of the system, even if they conflict with rules
identified by reference to the other criteria, whereas rules
identified by reference to the latter are not so recognized if
they conflict with the rules identified by reference to the su-
64preme criterion.
55. See HART, supra note 26, at 113.
56. Id.
57. Carey, supra note 24, at 1166 (emphasis omitted).
58. See, eg., Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 630-31. The best he could offer was his view
that "[i]n England they recognize as law ... whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts."
HART, supra note 26, at 99; see also Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 630-31.
59. See Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 635, 659-60; Carey, supra note 24, at 1178-79,
1192-94.
60. E.g., HART, supra note 26, at 92.
61. Id. at 102.
62. Id. (emphasis omitted).
63. Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 626 ("Hart ... reserves the words 'rule of recogni-
tion' to refer to ultimate standards for identifying law; in his terminology, a standard that
can be derived from another legal standard is not part of the rule of recognition.").
64. HART, supra note 26, at 103.
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One need not precisely identify the ultimate rule of recognition
to test the validly of the modern administrative state in the United
States.65 Instead, Hart specifies an approach to test the validity of
both primary laws and primary lawmakers against even a known
unknown, which we can suppose the rule of recognition is at this
time. To construct such a test, it is first necessary to address two
additional facets of Hart's work: Hart's internal point of view hy-
pothesis and a presumed first and second order application of the
rule of recognition.
2. The Internal Point of View Theory
Is it possible to demonstrate the existence of the rule(s) of
recognition in a given system, or must it remain assumed? Clearly,
in the day-to-day lives of those within a legal system who apply or
follow the primary rules, the basis for why a particular rule has the
weight of law is generally left unexamined beyond reference to its
status as a statute, ordinance, regulation, judicial decision, etc. In
this regard, an external viewer-a hypothetical person watching mil-
lions of interactions of citizens within a system-might begin to
develop theories on how certain actions will necessitate predictable
reactions. An outside observer will quickly understand that a rob-
bery, for instance, will result in some form of punishment such as
incarceration. But the external observer will not understand why
incarceration is the socially mandated and acceptable punishment
in the United States, while, for instance, equitable retribution (an
eye for an eye) is not.
For Hart, however, statements of legal validity made by internal
members of the system about particular primary rules-whether by
judges, lawyers, or ordinary citizens-also carry with them certain
presuppositions.6 What is left unstated is that the primary rule at
issue is one accepted as an appropriate social norm within the sys-
67
tem as ultimately measured, of course, by the rule of recognition.
Hart argues that it is not essential that every individual citizen spe-
cifically recognize application of the rule to legitimize the legal
65. Identifying the rule of recognition is necessary, however, to evaluate proposed re-
placements or changes to the current administrative system. See infra Part III.
66. HART, supra note 26, at 105.
67. See id. ("[The presupposed matters] consist of two things. First, a person who seri-
ously asserts the validity of some given rule of law, say a particular statute, himself makes use
of a rule of recognition which he accepts as appropriate for identifying the law. Secondly, it
is the case that this rule of recognition ... is not only accepted by him but is the rule of
recognition actually accepted and employed in the general operation of the system.").
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system as such." Instead, what is important is that officials within
the system regard these common standards or limitations on offi-
cial behavior and appraise each other's deviations as lapses.69 In
other words, the presupposition that is the application of the rule
of recognition is demonstrated every day by those internal offi-
cials within the system tasked with identifying what counts as law.
The very acceptance of, or acquiescence in, primary rules by a
majority of those officials demonstrates that they see those rules
in line with the system's rule(s) of recognition.70 This is Hart's
internal point of view theory.
3. First v. Second Order Application
As we have seen, through the rule of recognition Hart sought
to provide resolution to "doubts and disagreements" that natural-
ly arise within a system regarding which primary rules one is
obligated to follow, and which may have moral appeal to some
members in the group but are otherwise without legal force.
According to Professor Scott Shapiro, in dwelling extensively on
resolving doubt over primary rules within a system (what Shapiro
has labeled "first-order" uncertainty73), Hart overlooks another
type of uncertainty-that which arises over the legitimacy of pub-
lic officials to settle first-order uncertainty.74 As people within a
system are bound to have different views regarding "the natures
of justice, equality, liberty, privacy, security and the like," there is
certain to be disagreement over the proper form and function of
government just as much as there will be difference of opinion
over the meaning of primary rules.75 As Shapiro argues:
68. Id. at 112-13.
69. Id. at 113; see also Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 624 ("These tests or criteria need
not be understood by the general populace; they are employed by officials.").
70. See HART, supra note 26, at 105, 113; see also Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 626
("What counts as law depends ultimately upon prevailing social practices, that is, what offi-
cials take as counting as law.").
71. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 54, at 871. For Hart, an external observer of a system
could, on the basis of recording regular responses to conformity and non-conformity with
the rules, predict with a fair measure of success that deviation from the rules corresponds
with a hostile reaction (reactions, reproofs, punishment, etc.). HART, supra note 26, at 87.
The external point of view, however, cannot reproduce the way in which the rules function
as rules in the lives of those in the system. "For them the violation of a rule is not merely a
basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostility." Id. at 88.
72. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 25, at 250-52.
73. Id. at 250-51.
74. Id. at 251.
75. Id.
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Recognizing the prevalence of second-order as well as first-
order uncertainty is imperative, for the resolution of the latter
cannot be had without the resolution of the former. In other
words, public officials can resolve the doubts of, and disa-
greements between, private parties only if members of the
group are not uncertain about the identity of the public offi-
cials.
Herein lies what appears to be one of the many missing pieces of
Hart's puzzle: it is imperative that a legal system have a means to
test not only the validity of its primary rules, but also the validity of
its primary rule givers. As Shapiro appreciates, an efficient legal
system cannot resort to member deliberation, negotiation, or bar-
gaining over every second-order uncertainty dispute, nor can it
require its members to simply guess over proper distribution of
power.7 Therefore, in the interest of efficiency, as with first-order
disputes, uncertainty over the "content and contours of official
dut[ies]" must necessarily be resolved through appeal to the sec-
ondary rules, and, in particular one must believe, the rule of
recognition.
II. TESTING FIDELITY TO THE RULE OF RECOGNITION: A LEGAL
POSITIVIST ACCOUNT FOR THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
A. Official Acceptance Within the U.S. Legal System: The Role of Comity
Our tripartite national government "is premised on each institu-
tion's respect for and knowledge of the others and on a continuing
dialogue that produces shared understanding and comity."79 Comity,
of course, is necessary to preserve a workable government and,
thus, can be said to have a functional justification. But comity also
has a philosophical justification to the extent that, as Hart suggests,
through respectful engagement both branches are legitimized as
76. Id.
77. Id. at 252.
78. Id.
79. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997)(emphasis added); see also
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (noting that our collective national
experience reinforces that our legal system "is preserved best when each part of Govern-
ment respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other
branches").
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valid lawgivers.8 0 Thus, when the Supreme Court upholds an act of
Congress, or demonstrates its reluctance to overrule legislative ac-
tion even in the face of apparent constitutional defects,8 ' the
Court's actions speak equally to the validity of the primary rule as
to Congress' legitimacy within the system. Similarly, when the
Court overrules a popular act of Congress and faces resounding
criticism for the substance of its decision, the respect given by a
majority of the Congress, as well as the President, to the Court by
implementing its opinion fortifies certainty as to the status of each
of the branches." In short, comity is the mechanism through which
Hart's internal point of view theory is utilized daily in the United
States by officials to resolve both first- and second-order uncertain-
ty.
Comity among the branches demonstrates the legitimacy of
primary rules and legal actors in our system. However, what does it
mean when there is a lack of comity between branches, or more
precisely, a lack of agreement among a majority of officials within
the branches over the proper exercise or scope of power? In such
circumstances, legitimate authority may still appear to exist, but it
is more often than not controversial and/or contested. For a legal
positivist, the failure of a majority of public officials within the sys-
tem to accept authority by a legal actor leads to the conclusion that
such power is not only disputed, but it does not meet the social cri-
teria we are calling the rule of recognition as well. For example, for
over a century now the existence and parameters of presidential
80. See Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in Affirmative Ac-
tion Cases, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1931, 1949 (2007). Courts, for instance, in performing their
function of reviewing the actions of the other branches, place significant weight on the pre-
sumed validity of legislative action, e.g., Hardwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 557-62
(1986), as well as on allowable deference afforded the executive branch in enforcing enact-
ed laws, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835-37 (1985). Likewise, the Executive
Branch is expected to heed to Congress where, through the proper use of legislative power,
limits are set on presidential authority. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636-37
(2006) (Kennedy,J., concurring). Of course, Congress is expected to respect the independ-
ency of the judiciary, accept the role of judicial review of its laws, and refrain from
interfering in the disposition of pending cases. See Elisa Massimino & Avidan Cover, While
Congress Slept, HUM. RTs., Winter 2006, at 5, 5.
81. See Winkler, supra note 80, at 1948-49.
82. The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010), comes to mind in which the Court faced extreme criticism of its decision to
overturn portions of the McCain-Feingold Act that prohibited corporations and unions from
using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as
an "electioneering communication" or for speech expressly advocating the election or de-
feat of a candidate. See Adam Liptak, justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending Limit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at Al. Of course, Congress can always seek to overrule Supreme
Court decisions invalidating legislation through subsequent, valid legislative action. See, e.g.,
David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Closing the Enforcement
Loop, 21 ENvrt. L. 2233, 2238 (1991).
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authority (as opposed to judicial authority) to refuse to implement
constitutionally suspect statues has been "hotly contested," and a
seemingly fair number of officials refuse to recognize the legitima-
cy of the President doing so." In the same way, large numbers of
officials challenge the so-called unitary executive theory, which
purports to give the President direct authority over all administra-
tive agency decision-making processes," as a legitimate description
of executive power.85 In both cases, the presence of disputed se-
cond-order authority invalidates the president's action under the
internal point of view hypothesis.
B. A Demonstrated Lack of Comity for Environmental
Administrative Apparatus
History shows that actions by each of the three constitutional
branches of government confirm a deficient respect of the envi-
ronmental regulatory apparatus by other officials. Based on Hart's
theories, this calls into jeopardy the authority of environmental
regulators to issue primary rules to protect public health and wel-
fare.
1.The Courts' Hostile Treatment of Environmental
Agency Decisions
In theory, the scope of judicial review of environmental regula-
tory action is considered narrow-a court is to show tremendous
deference to the agency,"6 whether in interpreting its legal mandate
under the Chevron doctrine" or in reviewing an agency's policy-
related determinations during rulemaking under the APA's "arbi-
83. Dawn E. Johnson, Presidential Non-enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statues,
63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7,8, 14-16.
84. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Executive, and the Legitimacy
of the Administrative State, 33 HARv.J.L. & PUa. POL'Y 103, 109 (2010)(noting that the unitary
executive theory, also called presidentialism, "is the idea that the President has a wide range
of powers virtually exempt from congressional regulation or judicial review, including the
power of command over all discretionary policymaking of other executive officers").
85. Id. at 103-06.
86. Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza Ripieni Use of
Chevron Deference or The Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 115, 116-17 (1998); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Admin-
istrative Law, 1998 DuKE L.J. 819, 819-21 (1988).
87. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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trary and capricious" review standard." In reality, agencies face rig-
orous, probing review by the courts far beyond that given to either
legislative or executive action under the Constitution.9 Judge
Wald, for example, described the hard look "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of review" as a "catch-all label for attacks on the
agency's rationale, its completeness or logic,. . . or lack of evidence
in the record to support key findings" of law.9' Likewise, some
scholars have suggested that judicial review has become so intrusive
that agencies ultimately stop trying to pursue their regulatory mis-
sions through rulemaking and/or dwell so extensively on excessive
data gathering and analysis that the costs and delays of regulatory
programs become unbearable. These type of views about the rela-
tionship between agencies and the courts produces an image of
semi-hostility, not comity, in the mind.
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA3 re-
veals the insolence the Court can show to agencies and their
decisions, even under the most deferential of standards. The case
involved a challenge to EPA's denial of a rulemaking petition re-
questing that the agency regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
88. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43
(1983); Sierra Club v.Johnson, 436 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006)
89. See, e.g., Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth An-
niversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's Requirement of
Judicial Review "On the Record," 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 190 (1996).
90. Compare F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1447, 1447 (2010) (noting that in Federalist No. 78 "Alexander Hamilton
stated that the courts should overturn only those (statutory] laws that were 'contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution'" and that the Supreme Court has repeatedly maintained
that the judiciary may invalidate statutes "only upon a plain showing that Congress has ex-
ceeded its constitutional bounds"), with Young, supra note 89, at 210 (arguing that the
Supreme Court has "legitimated and perhaps intensified a trend toward increased judicial
scrutiny of agency action, particularly informal agency action, under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard"). Indeed, it is generally accepted "that 'arbitrary and capricious' review ... is
a far cry from the lenient scrutiny intended by Congress when it enacted the APA." Gillian
E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Law, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 479, 491
(2010); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) ("[A]n
agency's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. But that presumption is not to
shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.").
91. Patricia M. Wald, judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts
and Agencies Plays on, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 233-34 (1996).
92. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Sig-
nificantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393, 394-95 (2000). While there is no good data regarding the number of
agency decisions set aside by courts over the past fifty years, limited sampling byJudge Wald,
formerly of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, suggests that
the number may be as high as 47%. Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the
Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 621, 636-37 (1994).
93. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act.94 EPA denied the peti-
tion on the grounds that the agency lacked statutory authority, and
in any event it would be unwise to do so absent a more compre-
hensive national and multi-national approach to climate change.95
Indeed, EPA went so far as to suggest that the President's foreign
policy powers would trump any Clean Air Act mandate.96 A majority
of the Court flatly rejected all of EPA's arguments.
It is not surprising that, given the broad definition of an "air pol-
lutant" in the Clean Air Act' and the rather expansive mandate to
regulate air pollution from new automobiles in Section 202 of the
Act,98 the Court rejected EPA's assertion that it lacked statutory au-
thority."9 What is most "stunning," in the words of Professor Ronald
Cass, "is the seemingly effortless leap from [the Court's] decision
on authority to a conclusion that, because EPA may regulate, it must
and must do so now."'00 Professor Cass argues that "the Justices
stretch, twist, and torture administrative law doctrines to avoid the
inconvenient truth that this is not a matter in which judges have
any real role to play."01 He goes on:
The majority opinion in Mass. v. EPA reads like a faculty dis-
cussion paper or political position paper, intended for only a
like-minded crowd. There is no sense of real openness to the
EPA's analysis-questioning the clarity of global warming sci-
ence or the immediate need to do anything and everything
possible to combat it (even at the risk of impairing efforts at a
94. P. Leigh Bausinger, Note, Welcome to the (Impenetrable) Jungle: Massachusetts v. EPA,
the Clean Air Act and the Common Law ofPublic Nuisance, 53 VILL. L. REv. 527, 536 (2008).
95. Id. at 536-37.
96. See Colin H. Cassedy, Note, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Causes and Effects of Creating
Comprehensive Climate Change Regulations, 7J. INT'L Bus. & L. 145, 147 (2008).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006) ("The term 'air pollutant' means any air pollution
agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioac-
tive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance
or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.").
98. Id. § 7521(a) (1) ("The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time
to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.").
99. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
100. See Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93
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better solution) is received by the majority as an obvious de-
parture from common sense. o2
Of course, from a legal positivist perspective, the opinion
demonstrates that, despite the generalized tone of deference af-
forded in administrative jurisprudence for over sixty years, a major-
majority of officials on the Supreme Court lack trust in the EPA to
make the legal decisions assigned to the agency by Congress. And
this is not merely unique to this one case. As Professor Robert Per-
cival points out, despite a seventy-five year relationship between the
Court and administrative agencies, the Massachusetts v. EPA opin-
ion demonstrates that the tension between skepticism over the
regulatory state and tolerance for it, so prevalent during the New
Deal, has failed to diminish in the Court's mind.10 3 More im-
portantly, the lack of demonstrated comity suggests that the
environmental administrative state lacks the requisite legitimacy to
be fully trusted by the Court to accomplish its protective mandates.
2. The Executive's Misuse of the Environmental
Regulatory Apparatus
The Court's view of EPA (and other agencies) may be the conse-
quence of the Executive Branch's escalating manipulation of the
administrative decision-making process, in which politicians, rather
than scientific or technical experts, make the relevant calculations. o0
Returning to the essential question in Massachusetts v. EPA, when
asked to consider whether the government's climate change science
may have been manipulated, the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee concluded that indeed "the risks posed by cli-
mate change were deliberately understated [by EPA] through the
editing of scientific reports by non-scientists in the White House.",0o
Such audacious interference with the independence of any agency,
102. Id. at 83-84.
103. Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v EPA: Escaping the Common Law's Growing Shadow,
2007 Sup. CT. REV. 111, 112.
104. See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Deficit: Applying Lessons from the Economic
Recession, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 651, 664-65 (2009).
105. Id. at 665 (citing H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & Gov'T REFORM, 110TH CONG., POLIT-
ICAL INTERFERENCE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION,
at i (2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/
20071210101633.pdf). A similar recent example can be found in the White House's inter-
ference with decisions by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in implementing the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). Klein, supra note 104, at 665 (cit-
ing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY (2008)).
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and disregard for the very nature and purpose of the administra-
tive state, similarly demonstrates that officials of the Executive
Branch likewise lack the respect needed to establish this so-called
fourth branch of government with the necessary legitimacy to
function in our system.
3. Congress' Distrust and Misuse of Environmental Regulation
Administrative law scholars often comment on an air of distrust
and skepticism by Congress with regards to bureaucratic lawmak-
ing.'06 The relationship between Congress and congressionally
created regulatory agencies is characterized through intense and
pervasive oversight,"' which, in the case of EPA, for instance,
appears to be consistently adversarial and negative.0 s Of course,
an antagonistic relationship between governmental bodies is not
necessarily problematic, and is considered by some the intent of
the Founders of our constitutional system.0o Yet, there is also
evidence that Congress's distrust runs deeper-that it indicates a
lack of acceptance of agency legitimacy.
Take for instance the apparent trend of drafting tighter enabling
statutes to leave little if any room for agency interpretation. 0 By
intentionally limiting the range of agency discretion in making pol-
icy decisions, Congress, like the other branches, evinces that
legislative officials have little respect for, or trust in, the agency's
ability to perform the functions envisioned by the New Deal crea-
tors of the modern administrative state, at least in the
106. See LauraJ. Kerrigan, et al., Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law Penal-
ties-Civil Remedies, Alternatives, Policy, and Constitutional Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 367,
397 (1993) (noting that "Congress has tended to draft very specific statutes.... [T]his is
most likely the result of a distrust of the administrative agencies serving as policymaker.");
Jessica Owley, Piney Run: The Permits Are Not What They Seem, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429, 440 n. 88
(2003); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatoy Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture,
and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 83-84 (2002) (noting that the environmental stat-
utes' "anti-capture measures," such as citizen-suit provisions, emerged because of Congress's
"grave distrust" of regulatory agencies).
107. See S. REP. No. 110-124, at 49 ("The [congressional] Committee believes that con-
tinuous oversight by Congress is necessary given NOAA's track record . . . ."); Richard J.
Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight ofEPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes
(Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves?), 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 205,
206.
108. Lazarus, supra note 107, at 206.
109. Richard B. Stewart, Madison s Nightmare, 57 U. CI. L. REV. 335, 340 (1990); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
110. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 143 (1990); see also OFFICE
OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMs-REGO9: IMPROVE AGENCY AND
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1993), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/
library/reports/reg09.html.
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independent, professional, and technocratic manner once per-
ceived."' Conversely, Congress has also been known to take
advantage of the public distrust of the regulatory apparatus, such
as by intentionally punting to an agency "really tough policy choic-
es"11 2 and by misbranding policy issues as capable of being resolved
largely by agency scientific expertise."'3 In these instances, Con-
gress' misuse of the agency as a means to avoid their own political
accountability on an issue also suggests that these officials have lit-
tle interest in ensuring a legitimate, properly functioning
administrative state.
III. EDD AND AMERICAN VALUES: DOES IT SATISFY
THE RULE OF RECOGNITION?
A. The Promise of Environmental Deliberative Democracy
Today, most scholars accept that our nation's environmental sto-
ry has become a story of Congressional inaction"'4 and regulatory
backsliding."'5 As Professor John Dryzek has put it, "[i]f two or
more decades of political ecology yield any single conclusion, it is
surely that authoritarian and centralized means for the resolution
of ecological problems have been discredited rather decisively.""'6
The problem most often cited is straightforward-"the incomplete
representation of environmental interests [by the decision-making
institution], allied with the lack of environmental accountability of
[the] current state-centered political system[].""' Thus, the limited
111. See Sunstein, supra note 1.
112. Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 95
(2010).
113. Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
181, 197.
114. See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform
for the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2008).
115. See Klein, supra note 104, at 659-73.
116. John S. Dryzek, Strategies ofEcological Democratization, in DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 108, 108 (William M. Lafferty & James Meadowcroft
eds., 1996). At the root of this system, which has been labeled eco-authoritarianism, is the
belief that "a strong and cohesive leadership is indispensable for identifying the right solu-
tions to the environmental crisis as such and ensuring that they are implemented effectively
to the society at large, which is only available in an authoritarian but not a democratic re-
gime." Wong, supra note 18, at 4.
117. MICHAEL MASON, ENVIRONMENTAL DEMOCRACY 47 (1999); see also GRAHAM SMITH,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (2003) ("Contemporary liberal dem-
ocratic institutions are charged with lacking sensitivity to the plurality of values we associate
with the non-human world, and with employing techniques to guide decision making ...
that misrepresent and distort the nature of environmental values.").
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response to environmental concerns by government is considered
"a reflection of a ... decision-making process most receptive to
economic self-interest and powerful sectoral interest groups.""8
With regard to the administrative state, agency environmental de-
cisions are often viewed not only with dissatisfaction, but as the
mere product of an opaque process, with limited public participa-
tion and with no genuine accountability to democratic authority."9
Despite this realization about our environmental condition, op-
timistic new literature is emerging that seeks to examine and
improve upon the relationship between environmentalism and
democracy."o Chief among this literature is the concept of Envi-
ronmental Deliberative Democracy (EDD), which is most basically
defined as "a decision-making procedure which emphasizes the
processes of free and fair deliberation among individuals where
their preferences and value orientations are debated with a focus
of the need to realize the common good.""' EDD shares with other
liberal theories the desire to create political institutions that will
resolve conflict, but also acknowledges that in the "process of en-
gagement individuals' preferences and value orientations can be
transformed."'22 Thus, the primary distinction between EDD and
our existing system is the addition of a deliberative process-a de-
fined platform, if you will, for citizens and stakeholders "to call to
mind, raise, discuss and take care of ... interests other than their
own"-before the rendering of any decision.' According to envi-
ronmental deliberative democrats, individuals are inclined to make
more ethical or reasonable judgments when given the opportunity
in a public sphere to reflect about the whole environment as a
common good. This is particularly true when the public forum al-
lows others to challenge their potentially narrow, self-interested
viewpoints. 2 1
EDD advocates also reject the currently constituted administra-
tive state as a viable means to develop environmental policy. In
particular, "the rationality gained through 'specialized and compe-
tent fulfillment' of social tasks by expert [agencies has provided]
118. MASON, supra note 117, at 48; see also BABER & BARTLETr, supra note 16, at 3 ("The
environmental protection achievements of four decades have given rise . .. to a widespread
environmental complacency and to entrenched and even more sophisticated green opposi-
tion from political and economic interests.").
119. See Markell, supra note 5, at 653.
120. See, e.g., BABER & BARTLETT, supra note 16, at 1-2; MASON, supra note 117, at 2.
121. Wong, supra note 18, at 8 (citation omitted).
122. SMITH, supra note 117, at 56.
123. Wong, supra note 18, at 8 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 8-9; see also MATHEW HUMPHREY, ECOLOGICAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 95 (2007).
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no protection against the paternalism and 'self-empowerment' of
the administrative agencies" charged with caring for the environ-
ment.25 According to Professors Baber and Bartlett, improved
environmental regulation requires
more focused production of information about environmen-
tal challenges . . . that is broadly known, regularly reviewed,
and used as the basis for strategy development, tactics for-
mation, and resource allocation by agencies charged with
environmental protection. And it goes without saying that this
process of information generation and deployment must in-
volve frequent and meaningful opportunities for deliberative
input from as many interested citizens as can be accommo-
dated. 26
These concerns over the administrative state resonate loudly in
the United States, where administrative decision-making dominates
the day-to-day environmental policy agenda. 27 Accordingly, Ameri-
can law scholars have, in recent years, produced a mounting
collection of administrative law reform proposals. While many of
these proposals do not specifically align their writing with the EDD
movement, their ideas certainly overlap. As a general proposition,
the scholars, like other administrative law theorists, accept that the
administrative state is here to stay" and that a constitutional
amendment to legitimize the branch is highly unlikely. According-
ly, they look to statutorily mandated changes to agency procedure
to better check agency authority and politicization.
The American literature can roughly be grouped into three clas-
sifications, each increasingly more specific with regard to the role
of the public in the agency deliberation process. At the lowest level
are those suggestions grounded in the civic republicanism tradi-
tion.'2 These scholars often call for changes to the agency's
125. BABER & BARTLETT, supra note 16, at 10.
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. See generally Croley, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that "[administrative agency] deci-
sions dwarf those of the other three branches, certainly by volume and quite possibly by
importance as well").
128. See David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index Rule-
making, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 81, 100 n.118 (2005).
129. Modem civic republicans view the Constitution as an attempt to ensure that law-
making results from deliberation that respects, and reflects, the values of all members of
society. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1514. Two leading proponents of this theory, Cass Sun-
stein and Frank Michelman, argue that increased public participation and increased
deliberation by Congress is the essential means to fulfilling the civic republican promise. See,
e.g., Lisa 0. Monaco, Comment, Give the People What They Want: The Failure of "Responsive"
Launnaking, 3 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 735, 757 (1996). While "Sunstein adheres to the
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information gathering process to allow for public input at earlier
stages of the policy formation (in hopes of broadening both the
agency perspective and range of possible regulatory alternatives). 0
Similar calls for reform are made regarding the scope of judicial
review, giving the court authority to remand decisions with orders
to the agency to act in "a more deliberative manner" when issuing
rules."' At the intermediate level are those who desire greater di-
rect public participation in the decision-making process, generally
in the form of citizen advisory panels' 2 or citizen-based media-
tions.13 At the highest, most stringent level are those who call for
giving citizens direct substantive authority over agency decision-
making, possibly in the form of a citizen jury.134
Regardless of the classification, for a legal positivist, the primary
rules we desire to put in place to check agency authority must first
adhere to our system's underlying rules of recognition if there is
any chance of official acceptance of administrative lawmaking.
Thus, before scrutinizing whether EDD can legitimize the envi-
ronmental administrative apparatus, we are first duty-bound to
identify the applicable rule of recognition in our system to judge
the legitimacy of these bureaucratic lawmakers. Otherwise, it will
remain unclear, and certainly untested, that EDD proposals stand
traditional principle that 'basic value judgments should be made by Congress,'" other civic
republicans argue that the theory is also "consistent with broad delegations of political deci-
sionmaking authority to officials with greater expertise and fewer immediate political
pressures than directly elected officials or legislators." Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1514-15
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 BY.U. L. REv. 927,
941). In any case, civic republican theories are generally distinguishable from the next two
levels of deliberative democracy on the grounds that civic republicans "promote insulated,
expert bureaucrats deliberating over decisions in a 'public-regarding' way," as to outright
citizen participation in the decision-making process. Nou, supra note 18, at 604-05 n.17; see
alsoJim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Cost of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Deci-
sionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 212 (1997) ("As a conceptual matter, deliberation is
quite separable from participation."). But see Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective
on the National Environmental Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 92-94
(1996) (suggesting the establishment of citizen law juries with potential substantive authori-
ty over agency decision-making under the National Environmental Policy Act as a possible
means of achieving the type of participatory society envisioned by modern civic republi-
cans).
130. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1559-60.
131. Id. at 1549.
132. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory
Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 921-26 (1998); Fontana, supra note
128, at 88-89 (2005); Nou, supra note 18, at 606 (arguing for "deliberative cost-benefit anal-
ysis" in which "[d]eliberative forums ... of lay citizens ... engage in informed and
structured discussion" with regards to their individual preferences, which then informs
agency rulemaking).
133. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 132, at 914-20; Fontana, supra note 128, at 82-83.
134. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of Deliberative Democracy: A Proposal for a
Popular Branch, 33 RUTGERs L.J. 359, 363-65, 408 (2002); Poisner, supra note 129, at 92-94.
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any better chance at justifying the modem administrative state
than the numerous other offers made by theorists over the dec-
ades.135
B. The Rule of Recognition in the United States
(Second-Order Uncertainty)
Legal philosophers often argue that the ultimate rule of recog-
nition in the United States is the Constitution itself or some
distinct part of the Constitution.I Take the proposition, for in-
stance, that
the rule of recognition for federal law in the U.S. would be:
The text of the 1787 Constitution (including the amending
clause), and whatever is validated as law by that text (includ-
ing both amendments to the original text and subordinate
law, e.g., statutes enacted pursuant to Article I or judicial di-
rectives issued pursuant to Article III), is law.37
This may be an acceptable statement to resolve first-order un-
certainty, but when it comes to resolving the type of second-order
uncertainty questions that arise in the context of legitimacy of the
administrative state, the constitutional account of the rule of
recognition in the United States fails on two fronts. First, that the
ultimate rule of recognition must (or can) be embodied in an
express, written agreement like the Constitution misconstrues
Hart's own criteria; and second, such a notion does not comport
with real-world practice.
As suggested earlier, according to Hart, "every legal system nec-
essarily contains one, and only one, rule that sets out the [final]
test of validity for that system."'" The key, therefore, is in locating
"the master rule that exists by virtue of the fact of social acceptance
135. Indeed, for nearly sixty years economists, political scientists, and legal scholars
have advanced theoretical proposals to legitimize the post-New Deal administrative state. See,
e.g., Croley, supra note 7, at 5-6. Or as Professor Jody Freedman explains it, "administrative
law scholarship has organized itself largely around the need to defend the administrative
state against accusations of illegitimacy." Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 546 (2000).
136. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 642; Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Author-
ship By The People, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1605, 1614 (1999); Carey, supra note 24, at
1178-79.
137. Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practic-
es Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 719, 731 (2006).
138. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 238; see also supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
and not on the account of any further rule of recognition."'39 Inversely, a
norm that can be derived from reference to another norm is not,
by definition, an ultimate rule.'1 In the American system, however,
reaching beyond the text of the Constitution to some sort of high-
er authority is a well-entrenched practice by presidents, legislators,
jurists, and lawyers tasked with judging the validity of primary rules
and official acts. Thus, in considering the proper interpretation of
the Constitution's separation of powers provisions, or its meaning
with regards to an issue involving the balance of federal and state
authority, it comes of no surprise to find a legislator, president, or
jurist calling on the words of the Founders, or past officials, for
guidance. 4 1 In doing so, what the officials are looking for is a set of
social facts-namely the shared norms, customs, or values that un-
derlie our collective understanding of what constitutes the
American democratic system-for validation that their interpreta-
tion of the Constitution is the correct one.
The Constitution, which contains a majority of rules of recogni-
tion used on a day-to-day basis, is often a convenient proxy for
judging the validity of the nation's primary rules and legal institu-
tions. However, those social facts that Hart would call the rules of
recognition are not only capable of existing outside of a rigid con-
stitution, but must if a legal system's understanding of what
constitutes valid law is to evolve over time. In this regard, where the
text of the Constitution cannot provide clear resolution when a
question of uncertainty arises, officials should first look to "present
consensus," which, if it exists, "should be seen as a sufficient condi-
tion for determining the ultimate criteria of legal validity."'42 If
present consensus does not exist, however, then the proper way to
resolve the dispute is by "focusing on the reasons that the system's
constitutional designers had for adopting its basic institutional ar-
rangements" in 1787.'4 Rules, and most certainly the ultimate rule,
are capable of existing outside the Constitution as part of a com-
139. Schauer, supra note 54, at 870 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
140. HART, supra note 26, at 102-03.
141. As Justice Scalia has acknowledged, the Founders' views, as contained in the Fed-
eralist Papers and other writings, are, for instance, valuable in implementing the
Constitution because "their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of
the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood." ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
142. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 261.
143. Id. As Professor Shapiro sees it, "that a group of constitutional designers shared a
certain ideology regarding goals, values, and/or trust is a social fact." Id. at 266. However, by
privileging current consensus over historical social practice, Hart's theories of legal positiv-
ism are not consistent with originalism, which should focus only on the Founders' thoughts
regarding the Constitution. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 907, 907 (2008).
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mon understanding of the societal values of what constitutes a
democratic lawmaking institution, or a democratically enacted
primary rule, in our system.
Interestingly, it is moralist legal philosophers that seem to agree
that one need not turn solely to the Constitution to resolve legal
uncertainty arising in our system. As Professor Suzanna Sherry
proposed over twenty years ago, there is a strong historical record
to demonstrate that the Founders themselves never intended "their
new Constitution to be the sole source of paramount or higher
law."'" Instead, the Founders also recognized a "mixture of custom,
natural law, religious law, enacted law, and reason," which Sherry
labels part of fundamental law,'" which would continue to exist
and might serve to invalidate legislative action, even in light of no
apparent constitutional defect.'" Through meticulous historical
research, Sherry demonstrates that this unwritten fundamental law,
universally accepted in both England and the colonies, was often
of chief importance to the Founders during debates over the Con-
stitution, 48 was recognized by the first Congress,'" and continued
to play a role in judicial review of legislation after the Constitution
was ratified.5 o She argues, however, that modern constitutional law
has all but eradicated this link between the Constitution and fun-
damental law.'
Ironically, Sherry blames the loss of our understanding of fun-
damental law on "the legacy of legal positivism.,,52 In some respect,
this is true given the focus on the Constitution as the ultimate rule.
Her argument, however, as well as those focusing on the Constitu-
tion, misconstrues Hart's understanding of the rule of recognition.
Hart specifically believed that in a developed legal system, the rules
could not be identified "exclusively by reference to a text or list,"
but instead "by reference to some general characteristic possessed
by the primary rules."'5 In this regard, removing references to nat-
ural and religious law, Sherry's description of fundamental law is
not so different than what is argued above to be Hart's understand-
ing of the rule of recognition as a social norm, of a shared
144. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1127
(1987).
145. Id. at 1129.
146. Id. at 1128, 1167-68.
147. Id. at 1128-34.
148. Id. at 1157-61.
149. Id. at 1161-67.
150. Id. at 1167-76.
151. Id. at 1176.
152. Id.
153. HART, supra note 26, at 92.
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understanding of what is law based upon the existence of social
facts accepted by those within the system.1 4
Perhaps, however, if unconvinced by theory alone that the Con-
stitution must fail as the ultimate rule of recognition, consideration
of the very condition of the modem administrative state today can
better prove the argument. The administrative state, though
strongly supported by constitutional structures, lacks the hallmarks
of comity required for legitimacy. Clearly, there is no disagreement
that both Congress, under its Article I authority, and the Supreme
Court, under Article III, have repeatedly sought to legitimize ad-
ministrative authority. Congress has not only passed legislation
establishing specific administrative departments, it has on occa-
sions too numerous to count, acted to provide agencies the power
to carry out specific regulatory missions. Most telling of all, Con-
gress has acted through valid legislation-namely the
Administrative Procedure Act'"-to provide an overarching
framework for the administrative state to operate within.'5  Like-
wise, the Supreme Court has regularly imprinted a constitutional
seal of approval on the administrative state by upholding congres-
sional delegations.'57 The endorsement of the administrative state
by two branches of government, through constitutional action for
that matter, should seemingly, according to the rule of recognition
pronounced above, legitimize both the agencies as lawgivers and
regulations as primary rules. Clearly, however, it has not, and,
therefore, it can scarcely be argued further that the Constitution is
the ultimate rule of recognition in this country.
So what is a better candidate for the ultimate rule? The answer is
"trustworthiness." Trustworthiness is the one value shared among
the Founders, as well as citizens and officials today, that time and
time again stands out as the foremost basis for the structure of the
154. Id.; Shapiro, supra note 25, at 261.
155. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
156. Remarkably, Professor Shapiro has argued that the APA, although not part of the
Constitution, confers such rulemaking power to agencies that it should also be understood
as partially constituting the rule of recognition in the United States. Shapiro, supra note 25,
at 256.
157. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
158. The notion that the administrative state is a legitimate source of primary rules
would eviscerate Hart's basic understanding of the rule of recognition (that the rules make
the sovereign) and return us to the historical positivism approach ofJohn Austin andJeremy
Bentham (the sovereign makes the rules). See Shapiro, supra note 25, at 235. As Professor
Michelman observed, "[w]hatever you want to call it, [the ultimate rule] cannot itself consist
in the command of any lawgiver because it supplies the standard by which claims to the
status of lawgiver are verified (or not)." Michelman, supra note 136, at 1613.
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American legal system. Our government exists as a result of a social
agreement in which all "decline to trust the goodness of the rulers
to protect the rights of citizens."'" Again, as Professor Shapiro ex-
plains it: "[T]he interpretive methodology that best furthers the
designers' shared goals, values, and judgments of trustworthiness is
the proper one for interpreting the authoritative texts and hence
for revealing the content of the system's shared plan."'"'
That it can be said that "[o]ur entire government is based on
distrust of official power" is not, of course, expressly evident in the
text of the Constitution."' That term is not used anywhere in the
document. The Constitution is simply a framework document, lay-
ing out a government based on a system of checks and balances to
address the Founders' underlying distrust of officials.6 2 The Fram-
ers, of course, would feel no need to specifically set forth such
values in a framework document. As they had already clearly indi-
cated, the right of every person to address their grievances over
abuse of official power is a "self-evident" social fact that existed,
and continues to exist, in our system.16 3
C. Reconciliation: EDD and the Rule of Recognition
Part III.B. proposes that the ultimate rule within our system to
judge legitimacy of a lawmaking institution such as the administra-
tive state is measured by the trustworthiness of the institution.
Accordingly, until structural measures are put into place to bestow
credibility on the environmental administrative apparatus, then no
matter how deep their historical roots, and no matter how useful
the bureaucracy is to society, public attitude will continue to focus
on how the government power bestowed to administrative agencies
"is being held and exercised in accordance with [the] nation's
laws, values, traditions, and customs."'6 Such measures need not be
159. William Bradford Reynolds, The Challenge for Constitutional Respect in America, 11.
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13, 15 (1988).
160. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 261 (emphasis added).
161. Travis Christopher Barham, Note, Congress Gave and Congress Hath Taken Away: Ju-
risdiction Withdraw and the Constitution, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1215 (2005); see also
Willard Hurst, Discussion, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 75 (Edmond N. Cahn ed.,
1954) ("A very basic principal of our constitutionalism [is] a distrust of official power.").
162. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter,J.,
concurring) ("To that end [the Founders] rested the structure of our central government
on the system of checks and balances. For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not
mere theory; it was a felt necessity."); see also Sherry, supra note 144, at 1130 ("A constitution
was simply the norms by which people were constituted into a nation.").
163. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
164. See FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 10.
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implemented by a constitutional amendment-it is enough that
the structural form of the institution satisfies the ultimate rule.
Indeed, past practice demonstrates this to be true. Before the New
Deal, agencies were widely used, but the sense of illegitimacy that
surrounds them now was virtually non-existent. One reason might
be that the delegations in pre-New Deal times were far more lim-
ited,166  generally involving ratemaking and other specific
adjudications. More importantly, however, the function and proce-
dures of these early agencies took better account of fundamental
fairness and due process concerns so as to check arbitrary agency
power. Unfortunately, while the New Deal enlarged the scope of
agency delegation and expanded the function of the administrative
state, the procedural checks on agency trustworthiness have not
kept pace, notwithstanding the adoption of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946.
EDD, correctly, suggests that additional democratic procedures
are required to restore legitimacy, at least with regards to environ-
mental administrative law. Social psychologists, in fact, tell us that
that the extent to which a process is seen as "procedurally just" is
extremely important to judgments about the legitimacy of an ac-
tion.16 8 It should be becoming clear, however, that in order to be
successful in this endeavor, EDD theorists too are obligated to test
their principles against the rules of recognition. The proposals
must, of course, be designed with the ultimate rule of recognition
165. See David H. Rosenbloom, Retrofitting the Administrative State to the Constitution: Con-
gress and the Judiciary's Twentieth-Century Progress, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 39, 43- 44 (2000)
(arguing that the focus of the courts and Congress since adoption of the APA in 1946 has
been to make administrative procedures "more closely reflect democratic-constitutional
norms for legislating and governing").
166. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692- 93 (1892) (finding that the delegation in
question was limited to discretion on the facts, not as to the law); Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (distinguishing "those important subjects, which must be
entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to [agencies] to act under such general provisions
to fill up the details").
167. Before adoption of the APA, agency rulemaking typically followed trial-type adju-
dicatory processes. Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the
Decline of the Trial, 51 KAN. L. REv. 473, 485 (2003). These trial procedures, while more on-
erous on the administrative agency, provide greater process and fairness to the regulated
party. See Marshall J. Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REv.
337, 347 (1986) ("Formal rulemaking, whatever its conceptual virtue in ensuring due pro-
cess, has failed in practice because it emphasizes trial-type procedures that are not suited for
exploration of the general characteristics of an industry."); Levy & Shapiro, supra, at 485.
Although the APA did contemplate that rulemaking procedures might remain formal,
"[t]he United States Supreme Court facilitated the avoidance of formal rulemaking proce-
dures through a series of decisions that made clear that formal rulemaking procedures are
seldom required by due process, the APA, or an agency's organic statute." Id. at 485-87.
168. Markell, supra note 5, at 677.
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in mind (i.e., to instill trustworthiness into the system); but ob-
servance of all possible rules of recognition is also required. With
this in mind, we can now turn to consideration of substantive EDD
suggestions to legitimize the environmental administrative appa-
ratus and, more importantly, improve the quality of environmental
decision-making within these agencies.
IV. EDD: A LEGAL POSITIVIST PROPOSAL
A. Toward a Deliberative, Democratic, and Trustworthy
American Environmental Administrative State
There is no single prescription for reforming the environmental
administrative state. From a legal positivist position, however, some
proposals might have greater promise, some less, and some might
even further undermine the legitimacy of the administrative state.
For instance, returning to the earlier discussion of three classifica-
tions of EDD literature,6 9 it would seem that the highest level of
EDD-giving citizens direct control over substantive agency authori-
ty-is itself conspicuously contrary to our accepted democratic
values, which have long rejected that measure of citizen participa-
tion in government.' On the other hand, some level of citizen
participation in government short of directly controlling official
decision-making is considered "sacrosanct to modern democra-
cy."17 1 Public awareness and involvement in agency decision-making
eliminates regulatory "slack"72 and generates decisions that are
more accountable and transparent to the public. 7 ' Thus, public
169. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
170. See Monaco, supra note 129, at 739-40 (explaining that the Founders believed the
country could only be governed through representation and that direct control by citizens
would result in "the instability of successive majorities"); Rossi, supra note 129, at 192 (de-
scribing the Founders' distinction between a "republic" and a "pure democracy").
171. Rossi, supra note 129, at 180-81.
172. As Professor Michael Levine explains it:
"Slack" is the effect of information and monitoring costs that shield the actions of a
regulator from observation by a rational electorate. The operation of the economic
theory of regulation implicitly relies on the existence of slack. After all, if all actions
by regulators could be perfectly observed and understood and voted on, no regulator
in a democratic system could survive instituting a policy that left an institutional poli-
ty.. . worse off than before.
Michael E. Levine, Why Weren't the Airlines Reregulated?, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 273
(2006) (footnote omitted).
173. See David Markell, "Slack" in the Administrative State and Its Implications for Govern-
ance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2005); Rossi, supra note 129, at 182-83.
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participation in agency decision-making does appear to be a meas-
ure that can increase administrative legitimacy as measured by the
rule of recognition.
My own view of a reformed regulatory state is one where regula-
tors continue to function as the technical and scientific experts,
and in making policy determinations weigh the expert knowledge
with the informed opinion of electorate and peer officials in the po-
litical branches of our government. Such a system, I will argue,
requires four specific reforms: procedural requirements to im-
prove the quality of public participation; elimination of direct
involvement in agency decision-making by all political actors; an
obligation that an agency prepare a statement of overriding con-
sideration when informed views of the people and other officials
are disregarded in a decision; and limiting judicial review to ques-
tions of law and procedure. Each reform proposal is touched upon
below, but largely the intent is to leave these proposals for future
debate in the context of EDD and legal positivism.
Finally, in considering these reform proposals, and hopefully
others brought in the future in the context of legal positivism, im-
plementation should occur through Congressional action, and in
particular through addition of specific provisions to the APA. 7 4
While some reforms could occur through issuance of an Executive
Order, legislative action better conforms to existing structural
mechanisms that our system has in place to avoid additional se-
cond-order uncertainty problems. In other words, legislative action
is a trustworthier, democratic process; unilateral executive action is
not. Indeed, one of the concerns that has long dogged regulatory
cost-benefit analysis (CBA),"7 for example, is its unilateral imposi-
tion by President Reagan through Executive Order No. 12,1291.176
174. Again, I make the assumption as others have, that reform of the administrative state
will not occur through a constitutional amendment
175. Professor David Driesen offers the following definition of CBA:
CBA of a proposed regulation consists of estimates of the regulation's costs and of
the monetary value economists associate with the harms the regulation will avoid,
which the literature commonly refers to as benefits. CBA contemplates quantification
of the averted harms, including deaths, illness, and ecological destruction, in dollar
terms. CBA advocates claim that this is often possible, but concede that regulators
cannot quantify many relevant environmental and health effects.
David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 335, 339
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
176. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1980-1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000). "[S]ubsequent presidents, including President Clinton, have continued this pro-
gram, issuing a series of Executive Orders that required agencies to quantify 'benefits' and
compare them to costs whenever possible and legally permissible." Driesen, supra note 175,
at 345.
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Scholars have long argued that CBA is illegal because such a re-
quirement is inconsistent with many, if not most, action-specific
environmental statutes.'" In reforming administrative law through
EDD principles, we should not repeat the same mistakes by adopt-
ing measures through a less-than-democratic process.
1. Improve the Quality of Public Participation
Critics complain that participation in traditional "notice and
comment" rulemaking "suffers from problems of quality.",78 At one
end of the spectrum is the argument that public participation in
rulemaking is often just a means to ensure that the regulatory out-
come is generally responsive to the interests of the regulated. 79
Others protest that participation has been dominated by a handful
of individuals or groups who "carp, but offer little information to
inform the process."'80 Even worse, regulators are often inundated
with "postcard comments," written and duplicated by an interest
group without providing any new information to the regulator.18
Clearly, the participation process is broken.
EDD advocates want to fix the process by changing the nature
and scope of public participation in agency rulemaking, typically
by allowing for more one-on-one engagement with regulators
through a discursive process. To be meaningful, and to generate
more valid preferences for action, however, public deliberation
also needs to be informed deliberation.8 2 As Professor Sunstein has
argued, deliberation alone more often than not leads to group po-
larization. This effect is counteracted, however, where material
on issue is presented with corresponding claims and values to
b184group members.
177. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Rule of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1355, 1372-79 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD L. REvEsz & MICHAEL A. LIVERmORE, RE-
TAKING RATIONALITY: How CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008)). The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532), codified these re-
quirements to some extent. Driesen, supra note 175, at 345.
178. Beth S. Noveck & David R. Johnson, A Complex(ity) Strategy for Breaking the Logjam,
17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 170, 177 (2008).
179. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969); Noveck &Johnson, supra
note 178, at 177.
180. Noveck &Johnson, supra note 178, at 177.
181. Id.
182. See Nou, supra note 18, at 636.
183. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 85
(2000).
184. See id. at 73 n.6; Nou, supra note 18, at 636.
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Agencies need, therefore, not only to reverse what can be seen
as a trend toward reduced openness to the public,'85 but also to
take on the function of expanding the electorate's understanding
of complex environmental issues from a technical and scientific
viewpoint. By fashioning public participation in the context of "the
agency is listening," where regulators put participants on the spot,
often in live meetings, to give input without equal access to rele-
vant information,' government has produced a climate in which
most Americans have chosen to shy away from, if not outright
loathe, involvement in the rulemaking process. No wonder then
that nearly seventy-five years ago, Yale botanist Paul Sears recom-
mended that the United States hire a few thousand ecologists to
directly advise citizens on how to participate in government deci-
sion-making in order to put the whole nation on a biological and
economically sustainable track. 87 It is time to take heed and im-
plement such a discursive proposal.
2. Eliminate Direct Involvement in Rule-Making by Political Actors
As the Founders recognized in crafting the Constitution, good
government relies on democratic, not political, decision-making.'88
A legitimate administrative state, therefore, must be grounded in
the idea of an independent lawmaking institution that relies on
expertise, entrepreneurship, and stewardship-not politics-to
implement its mission."9 Procedures to insulate agency decision-
making from direct political control from the White House or
Congress are essential; not only must tampering with agency scien-
185. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 173, at 5.
186. EPA listening sessions are public community forums held to solicit public opinion
on what can often be complex environmental issues. See, e.g., Listening Session Notice, 74
Fed. Reg. 57313 (Nov. 5, 2009) ("EPA is announcing a listening session to be held on No-
vember 23, 2009, during the public comment period for the external review draft document
entitled, 'Toxicological Review of Choroprene: In Support of Summary Information on the
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS).'").
187. See Donald Worster, The Ecology of Order and Chaos, in OUT OF THE WOODS: ESSAYS
IN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 3, 4 (Char Miller & Hal Rothman eds., 1997).
188. See Stewart, supra note 109, at 335 ("James Madison identified domination by eco-
nomic and ideological factions as the central problem in a liberal polity.").
189. See Terence R. Mitchell & William G. Scott, Leadership Failures, the Distrusting Public,
and Prospects of the Administrative State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 445, 446 (1987). Expertise, of
course, refers to the formal education, administrative training, and organization socializa-
tion that administrators are believed to possess which allows them to be an expert in their
tasks. See id. at 447. Entrepreneurship refers to the "administrator as a source of innovation
and progress" on addressing social problems through regulation. Id. Finally, stewardship
refers to the legal, and some might consider moral, responsibility that an administrator has
to the public or others through the obligation to regulate. Id. at 448.
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tific and technical documents stop,90 but unilaterally imposed Ex-
ecutive Branch requirements, such as the controversial use of
independent cost-benefit analysis,19' must be ended. Such direct
(and literally unchecked) interference by one political branch is
far removed from our understanding of separation of powers that
is so imperative to the concept of trustworthiness in our system. A
wall must be erected between elected and appointed political offi-
cials on one hand, and professional, expert agency staff on the
other hand.
This is not to say, however, that Congress and the President
should play no role in agency decision-making. Congress certainly
has vast discretion in its delegations to establish the range of fac-
tors an agency should consider in reaching a decision 92 or to set
limiting parameters on the agency to prevent certain types of regu-
lations.93 The President also has significant authority to set a
regulatory agenda-assuming that Congress has not set firm dead-
lines-that best meets his political needs or ideology.19 4 Moreover,
both branches should play a greater role in the public deliberation
190. See supra Part II.
191. Cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") can be defined as "the systematic identification of all
future monetized costs and benefits associated with a proposed regulation or policy deci-
sion." Nou, supra note 18, at 603. Initiated originally by President Ronald Reagan's
Executive Order 12,291, and utilized by each President since that time, CBA is argued by its
advocates as a tool to "diminish[] interest-group pressures on regulation and also as a meth-
od for ensuring that the consequences of regulation are not shrouded in mystery but are
instead made available for public inspection and review." Id. at 612 (citing CORNELIUS M.
KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 178
(2003)). CBA opponents respond that the procedure has resulted in greater control by
political interest groups, and far less transparency in the rulemaking process. See, eg, RoB-
ERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: How GEORGE W. BUSH AND His CORPORATE
PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY 59 (2004). For a
detailed review of the arguments against CBA, see THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, SIDNEY SHAPIRO
& DAVID BOLLIER, SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT
RESPONSIBLE REGULATION (2004).
192. A classic environmental example would be the so-called five listing factors under
the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (2006).
193. For example, in amending the Clean Air Act in 1990, Congress included a special
provision relating to emissions of hazardous air pollutants from certain electric generating
units. This provision, known as section 112(n), prevented the EPA from regulating these
sources until a scientific study was performed and a regulatory determination made that
"such regulation is appropriate and necessary." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (1) (A) (2006).
194. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV.
117, 148-49 (2006); see also Steven Croley, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking: An Empir-
ical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 837 (2003) ("[B]y most acts of delegation Congress
intends for agencies to apply their expertise in the course of exercising their discretion.
Where instead Congress wants the president to have influence over particular decisions that
agencies make, as opposed to agenda-setting influence in ordering their statutory priorities,
Congress can so indicate by specifically delegating power to a White House agency. But in
the normal course, Congress delegates regulatory power to agencies so that agencies, not
the President, can exercise that power.").
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process for agency rulemaking. Indeed, a democratic system neces-
sarily requires that an agency not only take into account the
relevant scientific aspects of the problem, but, as mentioned, the
informed political views of the public and government officials.
What is most needed, however, is a rational process for agencies to
weigh these inputs and address how tension between science and
policy is to be resolved by the agency. The vehicle for doing so, it is
suggested, is not the traditional "concise general statement of [the
rule's] basis and purpose" requirement of the APA,19' but instead a
detailed statement of overriding consideration reflecting on the
agency's treatment of outside information.
3. Require Agencies to Prepare a Statement of
Overriding Considerations
Quite possibly a unique requirement in American law, the Cali-
fornia Environmental Quality Act requires that before an agency
approves a project that has been shown to have unmitigated envi-
ronmental impacts, the agency must first adopt a statement of
overriding considerations, which is "a declaration identifying spe-
cific social or economic factors that justify the failure to mitigate
the negative environmental consequences."' Similarly, federal
agencies should be required to prepare a statement explaining why
certain political concerns were elevated in the decision-making
process where substantial technical or scientific evidence indicates
that regulatory action would be a wise choice of action to protect
environmental resources or public health. As already discussed,
this proposal reflects the belief that, to Americans, even more im-
portant than the regulatory outcome is the transparency and
accountability of the regulatory process. If an agency indicates that
it chose a specific regulatory action as a means to address the Pres-
ident's economic policies, or because of limitations on its authority
placed by Congress, than as with a poor decision by any other
branch of government, there is at least a sense of legitimacy to the
regulatory action grounded in process. Moreover, the American
public will be in a better position to utilize other democratic pro-
cesses to effectuate a change to the underlying political basis for
the regulatory decision.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
196. See George Lefcoe, Should CEQA Require Local Governments to Analyze the Impacts of
Development Displaced ly Restrictive Land Use Planning, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1015, 1023 (2006).
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4. LimitJudicial Review to Questions of Law and Procedure
Judge Wald provides a luminous, if not sometimes near-
laughable, examination of the struggle courts have engaged in to
establish the scope of review to apply to agency rulemakings since
the 1970's, with a seemingly illogical attempt to accommodate both
judicial deference to, and scrutiny of, the agency within the same
judicial doctrine. Indeed, in the end Judge Wald acknowledges
that under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, most
often the court is simply struggling to find some agency explana-
tion that it can deem "adequate."'98 The lack of any defined
components of an "adequate explanation," however, has "inevitably
[left] courts open to the charge that the results of our review are
inconsistent and reflect the political or philosophical preferences
of the judges ... rather than any objective standard."'" Such re-
view, of course, can be considered necessary (or inevitable) in a
system where agencies are seen as illegitimate actors, but it should
no longer be tolerated in a system where agency decision-making is
the result of trust-inducing, deliberative processes and proce-
dures. 00 In such a "reformed" system, judicial review could be
relegated to review of agency interpretation of and faithfulness to
the law,20' and its adherence to proper procedure. This, of course,
is a function that the Founders intended that the courts would per-
form within our system where lawmaking institutions are
considered both legitimate and co-equal.202
B. Defending EDD: Restoring American Environmental and Democratic
Values
Inevitably, any proposal for regulatory reform will be challenged
as costly and inefficient.203 Certainly, for those who benefit from the
current institutional arrangements-in which abuses of power and
corruption are tolerated in exchanges for governmental benefits
197. Wald, supra note 91, at 229-30.
198. Id. at 234.
199. Id.
200. See Fontana, supra note 128, at 119 (noting that the "political pressure brought to
bear on a court by a deliberative deference-inducing agency process" would certainly result
in a change in the standard of review).
201. I offer no opinion here as to the proper scope of such review. For now the starting
point would be with the Court's opinions in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001),
and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
202. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
203. See, e.g., Nou, supra note 18, at 643.
WINTER 2011 ] 379
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
and services -such concerns are paramount. For those, however,
concerned with restoring legitimacy to the American system of
government, and afraid of the consequences if it is not, cost and
efficiency plays little if any role in judging reform proposals. Surely,
the Founders' desire to build a system to check political power in a
democratic fashion trumped their concerns over the bulkiness and
cost of government.
With respect to long-term problems, like those posed by envi-
ronmental policy and the legitimacy of the administrative state, a
broader focus is appropriate.2 5 In this context, the importance of
law "turns as much on its ability to help our successors share our
values, and to help both ourselves and our successors actually put
those values into practice, as on its direct impact on current behav-
ior."206 And much is at stake. Not only is environmental policy in a
decade-long standstill, there is deep agreement among the public
that an "appreciable segment of regulatory policy is [simply] coun-
terproductive.,0 o Not only does the belief that the government
often does "more harm than good resonate[] strongly with many
'average' Americans,, 20 but government decision-making is often
seen to be largely undemocratic.0 Our concern at this point
should not just be in correcting the democratic deficiencies of the
administrative state, but with the consequences of continued offi-
cial acceptance of such a system and/or the perceived use of the
administrative state by the constitutional branches to circumvent
constraints placed on them to ensure their trustworthiness. Under
such conditions, it can only be so long, if it has not already oc-
curred, that illegitimacy, as measured by a lack of trust in the
system, begins to afflict government institutions once considered
secure under the rule of recognition.2 o
204. Mitchell & Scott, supra note 189, at 451.
205. See Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values,
37 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 233, 234 (2003).
206. Id.
207. JeffryJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 550-51 (2002).
208. Id.
209. See Austin Sarat, Support for the Legal System: An Analysis of Knowledge, Attitudes, and
Behavior, 3 Am. POL. Q. 3,8 (1975).
210. Indeed, while Congress was once trusted to develop sound environmental and
other social policies, it is now marked by a "blood feud" among the political parties that has
resulted in "an era in which Congress is paralyzed." E. Donald Elliot, Portage Strategies for
Adapting Environmental Law and Policy During a Loglam Era, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 24, 24
(2008); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law, 94 CEO. L.J. 619, 620-22 (comparing "an ascent" in the 1970s and 1980s
in Congress' wielding of lawmaking authority to its more recent "descent" and the impact
this has had on environmental law).
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Certainly EDD does not hold the only answer to the illegitimacy
problem. The process, however, that EDD promises to inject into
administrative decision-making can play an important role in pro-
moting the legitimacy of administrative policies and protect against
violations of the public trust by agency officials. More importantly,
procedurally just processes, particularly those with public participa-
tion, are trusted to lead to better substantive decisions. This is the
heart of what Americans believe to be democracy and what consti-
211
tutes our ultimate rule of recognition.
CONCLUSION
"Culture, like the natural environment, will flourish if well tend-
ed and collapse if polluted and despoiled." 2 1 2
Improving any existing governance structures to better address
environmental protection has proven to be a formidable challenge
in the past.2 13 Undertaking an administrative reform effort to im-
prove environmental protection and restore the trust in
government necessary to the legitimacy of the administrative state,
therefore, would seem a near impossible undertaking. But as with
any undertaking, such reform needs to be fashioned procedure-by-
procedure, taking one step at a time. It is, of course, through the
establishment of democratic agency procedure that it will be possi-
ble "for issues and contributions, information and reasons to float
freely" within agency decision-making space." Such processes are
necessary for the development of the political will-formation that
will lead to just and agreeable decision-making that the populace
can once again trust.2 5 Moreover, through the lens of legal positiv-
ism, such processes are also necessary if our environmental
administrative apparatus is to be seen as a legitimate source of
primary environmental law. EDD offers such hope for administra-
tive legitimacy; hope that stands a chance to prevail as measured by
211. See Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 IOWA L. REv. 761, 779
(1989) ("Democracy is best understood as a political system allowing individuals opportuni-
ties for informed participation in the political process whose purpose is the promotion of
sound decisions.").
212. David W. Opderbeck, Deconstructing jefferson's Candle: Towards a Critical Realist Ap-
proach to Cultural Environmentalism and Information Policy, 49JURIMETRICSJ. 203, 204 (2009).
213. See Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Eco-Pragmatism and the
Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REv. 851, 882 (2003).
214. MASON, supra note 117, at 51 (citing JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
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America's deeply rooted democratic values and beliefs that consti-
tute our system's rules of recognition.
